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Abstract—Background: While bug bounty programs are not
new in software development, an increasing number of compa-
nies, as well as open source projects, rely on external parties to
perform the security assessment of their software for reward.
However, there is relatively little empirical knowledge about the
characteristics of bug bounty program contributors. Aim: This
paper aims to understand those contributors by highlighting the
heterogeneity among them. Method: We analyzed the histories
of 82 bug bounty programs and 2,504 distinct bug bounty
contributors, and conducted a quantitative and qualitative survey.
Results: We found that there are project-specific and non-specific
contributors who have different motivations for contributing
to the products and organizations. Conclusions: Our findings
provide insights to make bug bounty programs better and for
further studies of new software development roles.
I. INTRODUCTION
Software vulnerabilities have significant impacts on soft-
ware development and release management. For example,
before releasing Firefox 40 on August 11, Mozilla had to
release security updates 39.0.3 on August 6, 2015, as an
exploit was reported just before the planned release [1]. From
the study of the National Vulnerability Database, Homaei
and Shahriari reported that buffer errors, XSS, and access
control problems were most reported vulnerabilities during
studied seven years [2]. Bilge and Dumitras reported that after
vulnerabilities are disclosed publicly, the volume of attacks
exploiting them increases by up to five orders of magnitude
[3]. Given a general lack of available security experts and
time to have software vulnerabilities internally assessed, more
and more software managers are opting for crowdsourcing
solutions such as bug bounty programs.
A bug bounty program is a reward program offered by
an organization to external parties, authorizing them to per-
form security assessments on the organization’s assets [4]. In
general, only the first report of a valid, that is, reproducible
and fixable, vulnerability is rewarded; others are considered
duplicates and are not rewarded. Vulnerabilities that cause a
privileged escalation on the platform from an unprivileged to
admin or administrator are considered critical. Vulnerabilities
that severely affect multiple users or affect the security of the
underlying platform are considered high-priority vulnerabili-
ties. More significant vulnerabilities are rewarded with higher
values.
LaToza and van der Hoek presented three factors that distin-
guish crowdsourcing from other outsourced work: (1) the work
is solicited through an open call to which basically anyone
can respond, (2) the workers who volunteer are unknown to
the organization needing the work done, and (3) the group
of workers can be large [5]. The authors compared different
types of crowdsourcing work based on eight dimensions as
shown in Table I. Since the workers in bug bounty programs
need extensive domain expertise and extrinsic incentives,
the programs are closed to competition-type crowdsourcing.
In addition, bug bounty programs require extensive system
information and replication is not acceptable; these are the
same characteristics of peer-production-type crowdsourcing.
In sum, a bug bounty program can be considered a competitive
crowdsourcing work with the same nature as peer production.
Several previous empirical studies have helped to better
understand bug bounty programs. Munaiah and Meneely an-
alyzed the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS)
scores and bounty awarded for 703 vulnerabilities across 24
products, then found a weak correlation between CVSS scores
and bounties [6]. Finifer et al. analyzed datasets collected from
Chromium and Mozilla, and reported that both bug bounty
programs are economically efficient, compared to the cost of
hiring full-time security researchers [7]. Zhao et al. studied
Wooyun and HackerOne, bug bounty program platforms, and
reported a significant positive correlation between the expected
bounty values and the number of received vulnerabilities [8].
They also reported that a considerable number of programs
showed a decreasing trend in vulnerability reports. Hence, it is
important that software managers gain a good understanding
of bug bounty program contributors in order to build better
programs instead of just increasing bounty values.
This study focuses on understanding the characteristics of
bug bounty program contributors by highlighting the het-
erogeneity of contributors to address the following research
question: What contributor heterogeneity exists in bug bounty
programs? A deep understanding of bug bounty contributors
will help managers to reach potential contributors and to
incentivize them effectively. To answer this question, we
examined past contribution histories in multiple bug bounty
programs and conducted a quantitative and qualitative survey,
and then found that there are project-specific and non-specific
contributors who have different activities and motivations.
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TABLE I
COMPARISON OF CROWDSOURCING MODELS. THE CONTENTS OF THE BUG BOUNTY PROGRAMS ARE PRESENTED BY THE AUTHORS AND OTHER
CONTENTS WERE PREVIOUSLY PRESENTED BY LATOZA AND VAN DER HOEK [5].
Peer production Competitions Microtasking Bug Bounty
Dimension (Open source) (TopCoder) (UserTesting.com) Programs
Crowd size (necessary crowd size for tasks) Small to medium Small Medium Small
Task length (amount of time) Hours to days Week Minutes Hours to days
Expertise demands (required domain familiarity) Moderate Extensive Minimal Extensive
Locus of control (ownership of the creation) Worker Client Client Client
Incentives (factors motivating workers) Intrinsic Extrinsic Extrinsic Extrinsic
Task interdependence Medium Low Low Medium
Task context (amount of system info needed to know) Extensive Minimal None Exftensive
Replication (same task might be completed) None Several Many None
TABLE II
A BRIEF SUMMARY OF STUDIED BUG BOUNTY PROGRAMS,
APPROXIMATE BOUNTY RANGES AND SELECTED PROGRAMS.
Targets Programs Bounties
Chromium
Browser, OS, etc. Microsoft $500 - $100,000
Mozilla
AT&T
Web and/or Mobile Facebook $25 - $15,000
Yahoo
Coinbase
Digital currency platform Ethereum 0.2 - 100 BTC
Pikapay
PHP
Programming Language Python $50 - $1,500
Ruby
II. DATA COLLECTION OF HISTORIES
To avoid the bias in program selection, we made use
of the following two publicly available lists of bug bounty
programs: a list provided by bugsheet in http://bugsheet.
com/directory/, and a list provided by Bugcrowd, a company
of bug bounty program platforms, in https://bugcrowd.com/
list-of-bug-bounty-programs/.
A. Selecting Programs
In the above lists, some programs offer swags or gifts, or
only publish contributors on their acknowledgements pages.
To focus on bounty programs providing monetary rewards,
we ignored such programs. Since bug bounty programs are
a new trend and retaining contributors is not easy [8], some
programs disappeared when we accessed them. If programs
did not make contributor information public, we also ignored
such programs. We investigated these programs until early in
August 2015, and found 82 active bug bounty programs that
provided Hall of Fame for contributors; 33 programs were
served in their own websites, and 49 programs were presented
in bug bounty program platforms, Bugcrowd or HackerOne.
One program, Barracuda, had its own website, but then
moved to the Bugcrowd platform. We analyzed both websites
to gather the data of contributors’ activities of Barracuda.
Table II presents a brief summary of the obtained programs
with their targets, selected programs, and summarized bounty
ranges. We selected a wide variety of bug bounty programs
including the popular browser and OS-related programs of
Chromium, Microsoft, and Mozilla. Programs targeting Web
and/or mobile applications make up the majority of our list.
In addition to major companies like AT&T, Facebook, and
Yahoo, there exist programs provided by startup companies
and OSS projects. Digital currency-related programs are an-
other popular target class. There are nine such programs,
and most of them prepared BTC bounties. Some programs
including Flash, PHP, Python, Ruby, etc. are provided by
The Internet Bug Bounty sponsored by Facebook, Microsoft,
and HackerOne. There are programs provided by companies
in Russia and the Netherlands. If program descriptions and
contributor parts were not written in English, we used a
translation service to read appropriate information. However,
we extracted the contributors’ names or identifiers as they
appeared without translation into English.
When focusing on bounties, browser and OS-related
programs prepared higher bounties ($500 - $100,000).
Compared to these programs, Web and mobile application-
related programs will pay lower bounties ($25 - $15,000).
When we consider 1 BTC as $500.00, the bounties of digital
currency-related programs are relatively high values (about
$100.00 - $50,000.00).
B. Collecting Contributor Information
For all 82 programs, we accessed their program websites
and extracted contributor information. We collected account
names, (full) names, and URLs (own websites, Twitter pages,
Facebook pages, LinkedIn pages, etc.) if provided and the
number of bounties (reports) they contributed and rewarded.
Private accounts in Bugcrowd were ignored since we could
not distinguish each account. Although many programs ranked
contributors (not based only on the number of reports, but
also on their severities), we did not extract rank information.
If programs provided a contributor name for each bounty, we
counted the number of bounties for each contributor. Some
programs only showed contributor names in the whole period
or for some periods (such as in years). In these cases, we
considered the number of names in all periods as the number
of their contributions.
C. Merging Contributor Identities
From the collecting phase, we had more than 6,400 contrib-
utor names/accounts including duplicates. Similar to identity
at.t badoo barracuda chromium etsy facebook github helpscout mozilla olark paypal slack yahoo yandex
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Fig. 1. Parallel coordinates of contributors. Colored lines represent three archetypes, A1, A2, and A3.
merging [9], we merged the same contributors’ different
names/accounts into single identifiers. From the obtained con-
tributor information, we considered a set of < name, account
name, websites > as contributor identifiers. Depending on
the data richness of program websites, some items could not
be obtained and some items had much information (there
could be several URLs). As shown in the report of Bugcrowd
[4], there were various contributors from different countries,
and some names were written in their own languages. In
addition, several contributors used special characters and emoji
or emoticons for their identifiers; many contributors showed
their names or accounts inconsistently in different programs,
and there were many similar names on the list. Because of
these issues, we believe that preparing an accurate merging
automation technique would be costly. Therefore, we manually
investigated all identifiers using sorting and searching terms
repeatedly. Some contributors showed full names for some
programs, but shortened names (for example, without middle
names) for other programs. We considered them identical if
common parts were the same. Twitter accounts provided good
clues because the same identifiers tend to be used for their
account names. In this merging process, we ignored contrib-
utor teams based on their names, for example, companies
and laboratories, because their activities are different from
individual contributors’ activities. As a result, we obtained
2,504 distinct contributors.
III. HISTORY ANALYSIS
A. Demographics
About 60% of contributors have been rewarded only one
bounty, and 67% have contributed to single program. Among
2,504 contributors in various programs, one-third of contrib-
utors has contributed to multiple programs. So contributing
to multiple programs is not rare but common activities for
bug bounty contributors. Although top 20% (500 contributors)
contributed to 64% bounties, the amount of bounties worked
by other less active contributors is also large, 36%. This
implies that attracting new contributors is important for bug
bounty programs.
B. Archetypal Analysis
To analyze the characteristics of all contributors, we adopt
an archetypal analysis. An archetypal analysis is a statistical
method that synthesizes a set of multivariate observations
through a few, not necessarily observed points (archetypes),
which lie on the boundary of the data scatter and represent pure
individual types [10]. Archetypal analysis describes individual
data points based on the distance from extreme points, whereas
cluster analysis focuses on describing its segments using the
average members as the prototypes. Marketing research is one
of fields that have adopted archetypal analysis because it can
provide well-separated typical consumers [11], and therefore,
we consider such analysis as also preferable for our study. The
R package archetypes [12] was used for this analysis.
To characterize contributors by the combinations of differ-
ent programs in which they got bounties, we prepared an
n × m matrix, which represents a multivariate dataset with
n contributors who had worked on multiple programs (826)
and m programs that had more than 50 contributors who
had more than one bounty (14). Each value is the number
of contributions for a program. From the “elbow criterion”
with the curve of the residual sum of squares (RSS), k = 3 is
determined as the number of archetypes.
Figure 1 presents a parallel coordinate plot of all bug bounty
contributors. Each line shows the number of contributions
to different programs by one contributor. The three colored
lines are archetypes in this data (red is Archetype 1, blue
is Archetype 2, and green is Archetype 3). Note that the
archetypes are not always actual contributors who are being
observed, but are generated from the multidimensional data
to be representatives of pure archetypes. Then each observed
contributor can be regarded as a mixture of those archetypes.
Obtained archetypes can be summarized as follows.
A1: less active
A2: project specific
A3: non−specific
Fig. 2. A simplex visualization. Each dot represents a contributor, and the
corners represent three archetypes A1, A2, and A3 as shown in Figure 1. If
a dot is close to a corner, it means that the contributor the dot represents is
similar to the archetype.
• Archetype 1 (A1) is a less active contributor. Contributors
close to this archetype might have been rewarded a few
bounties. They are likely to contribute to either Yahoo,
AT&T, Paypal, Slack, or Facebook.
• Archetype 2 (A2) contributes only to the specific pro-
grams Chromium and Mozilla, and sometimes GitHub.
• Archetype 3 (A3) contributes to many programs excluding
Chromium and Mozilla.
Figure 2 shows a simplex visualization [13] of the results.
Each point, a contributor, is plotted among three archetypes.
A cluster near the line between A1 and A3 represents con-
tributors who contributed less actively to actively for various
(not specific) programs, and most contributors belong to this
cluster. Although there are not so many contributors, there is
another group of contributors near the line between A1 and
A2. These contributors tended to contribute to Chromium and
Mozilla. There are some contributors located between the two
clusters.
Observation 1: Most contributors are less active (have
only a few contributions). There are two types of active
contributors, project-specific and non-specific contributors,
and the latter is the majority of active contributors.
Considering this observation, should managers pay attention
to the different types of contributors? In order to answer this
question, we directly contacted both types of contributors.
IV. QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE SURVEY
A. Selecting Contributors
We selected all active contributors close to A2 (project-
specific) and A3 (non-specific) archetypes, and then searched
their names in the Web. If their email addresses were publicly
available, we distributed a survey. We found nine email ad-
dresses, and received three answers from A2 contributors and
four answers from A3 contributors. In general, it is difficult
to obtain the contact information of bug bounty contributors
because they tend not to make their profiles publicly available.
This implies that those bug bounty contributors are different
from developers, who make their profiles open to the public.
B. Quantitative Results
Table III summarizes the results of five questions. Regarding
the profiles (Q1), A3 (non-specific) contributors considered
themselves bug bounty hunters or a security researcher. How-
ever, A2 (project-specific) contributors did not consider them-
selves bug bounty hunters, but rather, security researchers or
developers. For A3 (non-specific) contributors, motivations for
reporting security bugs (Q2) were mostly bounties. However,
A2 (project-specific) contributors had various motivations;
making the products secure, helping users and developers, and
receiving bounties and reputation.
We found a significant difference in the time spent to find
and report a bug (Q3). A3 (non-specific) contributors spent at
most half a day, while A2 (project-specific) contributors tended
to work from several days to one week on average. Since
A3 (non-specific) contributors work on many programs, they
could avoid work that required much time, or they could try
their techniques or apply their knowledge to many programs
using only about a half day’s effort. However, A2 (project-
specific) contributors focused on specific programs and spent
much time to find and report security bugs. Our contributor
categorization and the survey revealed that there are clearly
different approaches in addressing bug bounty programs.
Question Q4 to contributors was: Why do you contribute
to bug bounty programs? The majority of A3 (non-specific)
contributors’ answers were: Because of the amount of bounties,
and I found security bugs in the products. For A2 (project-
specific) contributors, the majority of answers were: I use
the products, and I like the company/organization. Again we
see that A2 contributors chose programs because of their
organizations and products. These results confirm the findings
from quantitative analysis, that is, why some contribute to
specific programs and some contribute to many programs.
Finally, we asked a controversial question (Q5): Do you
have options to sell security bugs in black/gray markets?
Black markets are criminal interactions, and gray markets
are interactions between sellers and government agencies, as
legal business deals [14]. No A3 (non-specific) contributor
reported the option to involve black or gray markets. However,
one A2 (project-specific) contributor answered that s/he had
the option of selling security bugs in those markets. Another
A2 contributor selected Other and left a comment that the
bounty sum was a factor, but it was more important to feel
that her/his work was appreciated by the vendor. This might
be reasonable because A3 contributors mainly work in many
bug bounty programs so that they had less motivation to sell
bugs to black/gray markets. However, A2 contributors expend
much effort working on specific programs. In other words,
if they receive an unreasonable amount of bounties, some A2
contributors might think of selling bugs to black/gray markets.
This implies that it is important for the bug bounty program
organizers to consider the amount of effort required in order to
attract contributors, especially by project-specific contributors.
TABLE III
SURVEY RESULTS FROM THREE A2 AND FOUR A3 CONTRIBUTORS.
Questions A2 (Project-specific) A3 (Non-specific)
Q1. What best describes your profile?
Security researcher 3 1
Bug bounty hunter 0 2
Developer 1 0
Q2. What motivates you to report security bugs? (Multiple answers possible)
Making the products secure 3 1
Helping users and developers 3 1
Bounties 3 3
Reputation 3 2
Other 1∗ 0
Q3. How much time does it take on average to find and report a bug?
Less than 2 hours 0 1
2 to 6 hours 0 2
6 to 24 hours (1 day) 0 0
1 to 3 days 1 0
3 to 7 days (1 week) 2 0
More 0 0
Other 1† 0
Q4. Why do you contribute to bug bounty programs? (Multiple answers possible)
I like the company/organization. 3 0
I use the products. 4 0
Part of my work is related to the products. 2 0
The products have many users. 2 1
Because of the amount of bounties. 2 2
I just found security bugs in the products. 2 2
It is open source. 2 0
The bug bounty program is well documented, prepared, and managed. 2 1
I am familiar with some bugs related to the product. 0 0
Other 0 1‡
Q5. Do you have options to sell security bugs in black/gray markets?
Yes, if someone will buy them with high value. 1 0
No. I will sell them to the vendors. 2 2
No idea. 0 1
Other 1◦ 0
∗ Contributing to the security of widely used open source programs.
† A few hours of my time, but days or weeks of computer time.
‡ Gaining more experience dealing with new apps and technologies.
◦ Receiving a bounty sum is a factor, but I think it is more important that I feel that my work is appreciated by the vendor.
Observation 2: Project-specific contributors work on pro-
grams because of the organizations and products, and tend to
spend several days finding and reporting a bug, although non-
specific contributors spend at most half a day on a project.
As shown and discussed in Table I, a bug bounty program
can be considered a competitive crowdsourcing work with the
nature of peer production. Project-specific contributors seem
to have the mind of peer production workers. As seen in the
comment of an A2 (project-specific) contributor, appreciation
for their work can be key in incentivizing a contributor to
continue finding security bugs.
C. Qualitative Results
To uncover more details, we again contacted the survey
respondents and had answers from two A2 (project-specific)
and one A3 (non-specific) contributors. In the previous survey,
we did not distinguish human and machine time in Q3. The
A2 contributors revealed that they spend several human hours
per week, but the computers run all the time. Although A3
contributors mainly work in bug bounty program platforms,
the A2 contributors have different ideas. One considers such
platforms generally negative because any party other than
the development project upstream is a potential security issue
in itself. Another contributor did not use platforms, but only
reported vulnerabilities directly to the vendors. One A2 con-
tributor considered all third-party programs as Gray market,
and s/he has options to sell security bugs in Gray markets in
theory. Black markets were out of consideration for all three
respondents.
What are bug bounty contributors expecting from bug
bounty programs? Although the A3 (non-specific) contributor
claimed a decent amount of bounties, an A2 (project-specific)
contributor required information flow in both directions. S/he
thought it important to get information and stories from the
vendor’s side, rather than just throw reports and get money in
return. We think this an important clue for how bug bounty
programs work with project-specific contributors.
V. DISCUSSION
A. Threats to Validity
Problems in merging contributor identifiers. Since this
process has been conducted manually, there can be biases
and mistakes in merging. However, compared to automated
techniques, we believe our manual inspections were more
accurate.
Limited datasets. Although we investigated all bug bounty
programs in two separately maintained lists, there can be
other programs that have not appeared in these lists. This
concern is related to external validity. Although it is difficult
to generalize our findings from our limited datasets, we would
like to emphasize that our datasets contained various programs.
Limited survey. Because of the difficulty of obtaining the
contact information of the contributors, we have answers from
only seven bug bounty contributors. Further work should be
beneficial to widen the scope of this survey.
B. Beyond Onion Models
The onion models have been widely studied for open source
software development communities [15], [16]. “Onion” refers
to the successive layers of member types from core members,
contributing developers, bug reporters, and users, for example.
In the onion models, advancement through the member types
is reward and recognition for each member’s abilities and
achievements [17], and developer initiation in OSS depends
on the social and technical actions of project contributors
[18]. Therefore, newcomers must first become familiar with
the code base, architecture, build environment, and work
practices, which might take days or weeks [5]. Bug bounty
program contributors are almost outside of traditional software
development hierarchies and onion models. However, talented
contributors are highly required and have a significant impact
on software development. Some studies have started analyzing
monetary activities and impacts on software development
ecosystems [19], [20].
VI. CONCLUSION
Since security bugs can have significant impact on software
development and users, attracting and managing bug bounty
contributors present new challenges. This study revealed that
there are two different types of contributors. Most bug bounty
contributors are non-project-specific bug bounty hunters and
are different from traditional contributors who work on specific
projects. Although there are not many, but also there exist
project-specific security contributors.
Our practical recommendation for program managers is that
they first need to know whether there are project-specific
specialists in their software development communities, and
then they need to think of retaining them by expressing appre-
ciation and preparing channels to communicate, for example.
Moreover, program managers also need to consider attracting
non-specific security specialists with reasonable bounties.
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